Ripa encryption keys clause to get the go-ahead?

The UK government is preparing to give the police the authority to force organisations and individuals to disclose encryption keys, a move which has outraged some security and civil rights experts.

The powers are contained within Part 3 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (Ripa). Ripa was introduced in 2000 but the government has held back from bringing Part 3 into effect. Now, more than five years after the original act was passed, the Home Office is seeking to bring Part 3 into force.

Some security experts are concerned the plan could criminalise innocent people and drive businesses out of the UK. But the Home Office, which has just launched a consultation process, says the powers contained in Part 3 are needed to combat an increased use of encryption by criminals, paedophiles and terrorists.

Liam Byrne, Home Office minister of state told parliament last week: "The use of encryption is... proliferating. Encryption products are more widely available and are integrated as security features in standard operating systems, so the government has concluded that it is now right to implement the provisions of Part 3 of Ripa... which is not presently in force."

Part 3 gives the police powers to order the disclosure of encryption keys, or force suspects to decrypt encrypted data.

Anyone who refuses to hand over a key to the police would face up to two years' imprisonment. Under current anti-terrorism legislation, terrorist suspects now face up to five years for withholding keys.

If Part 3 is passed, financial institutions could be compelled to give up the encryption master keys they use for banking transactions, experts have warned.

Cambridge University security expert, Richard Clayton, told silicon.com sister site ZDNet UK on Wednesday: "The controversy here [lies in] seizing keys, not in forcing people to decrypt. The power to seize encryption keys is spooking big business.

Clayton added: "The notion that international bankers would be wary of bringing master keys into the UK if they could be seized as part of legitimate police operations, or by a corrupt chief constable, has quite a lot of traction. With the appropriate paperwork, keys can be seized. If you're an international banker you'll plonk your headquarters in Zurich."

Opponents of the Ripa have argued that the police could struggle to enforce Part 3, as people can argue they don't possess the key to unlock encrypted data in their possession.

Writing on a ukcrypto, a public email discussion list, encryption expert Peter Fairbrother pointed out: "It is, as ever, almost impossible to prove 'beyond a reasonable doubt' that some random-looking data is in fact cipher-text and then prove that the accused actually has the key for it and that he has refused a proper order to divulge it."

Clayton backed up this point. "The police can say 'we think he's a terrorist' or 'we think he's trading in kiddie porn', and the suspect can say, 'no, they're love letters, sorry, I've lost the key'. How much evidence do you need [to convict]? If you can't decrypt [the data], then by definition you don't know what it is," said Clayton.

The Home Office on Wednesday told silicon.com sister site ZDNet UK it would not reach a decision about whether Part 3 will be amended until the consultation process has been completed.

A Home Office spokeswoman said: "We are in consultation and are looking into proposals on amendments to Ripa. The Home Office is waiting for the results of the consultation [before making any decisions]."

The Home Office said last week that the focus on key disclosure and forced decryption was necessary due to "the threat to public safety posed by terrorist use of encryption technology".

Clayton, on the other hand, argues that terrorist cells do not use master keys in the same way as governments and businesses.

He said: "Terrorist cells use master keys on a one-to-one basis, rather than using them to generate passkeys for a series of communications. With a one-to-one key, you may as well just force the terrorist suspect to decrypt that communication, or use other methods of decryption.

"My suggestion is to turn on all of Part 3, except the part about trying to seize keys. That won't create such a furore in financial circles."

Tom Espiner writes for ZDNet UK